Likelihood normalization for face authentication in variable recording conditions by Sanderson, C. & Paliwal, K. K.
LIKELIHOOD NORMALIZATION FOR FACE AUTHENTICATION
IN VARIABLE RECORDING CONDITIONS
Conrad Sanderson and Kuldip K. Paliwal
School of Microelectronic Engineering
Griffith University
Brisbane, QLD 4111, Australia
ABSTRACT
In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of two likelihood
normalization techniques, the Background Model Set (BMS)
and the Universal Background Model (UBM), for improving per-
formance and robustness of four face authentication systems uti-
lizing a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) classifier. The systems
differ in the feature extraction method used: eigenfaces (PCA),
2-D DCT, 2-D Gabor wavelets and DCT-mod2. Experiments on
the VidTIMIT database, using test images corrupted either by an
illumination change or compression artefacts, suggest that likeli-
hood normalization has little effect when using PCA derived fea-
tures, while providing significant performance improvements when
using the remaining features.
1. INTRODUCTION
A face authentication system verifies the claimed identity based on
images (or a video sequence) of the claimant’s face. Such systems
have forensic and security (ie. access control) applications.
It seems all current face-based authentication systems,
eg. [1, 2, 3, 4], effectively follow a thresholding approach to make
the final accept or reject decision. The result of comparison of
the claimant’s features (X) with a model belonging to the person
whose identity is being claimed (
C
) is a matching score or a like-
lihood. Let us refer to this result as p(Xj
C
). Given a threshold t,
the claim is accepted when:
p(Xj
C
)  t (1)
and rejected otherwise. However, if there is a mismatch between
training and testing conditions, the claim may be automatically re-
jected due to a low likelihood. The mismatch can occur due to,
for example, different cameras being used, an illumination change
(important in security applications) or compression artefacts (im-
portant in forensic work dealing with compressed video).
In speech-based verification systems it has been found that use
of normalized likelihoods improves performance as well as robust-
ness [5]. By reformulating Eqn. (1) in the Bayesian framework, the
claim is accepted when:
p(Xj
C
)
p(Xj
C
)
 t (2)
where p(Xj
C
) is the result of the claimant’s features being com-
pared to an anti-client model (
C
), ie. the likelihood of the claimant
being an impostor. If the testing condition causes p(Xj
C
) to de-
crease, then it is reasonable to suppose that p(Xj
C
) will also
decrease - thus the ratio of the likelihoods may remain relatively
unaffected. In effect, the threshold is automatically tuned for each
person to account for environmental conditions.
There are two popular approaches for finding the impostor
likelihood:
1. Background Model Set (BMS) approach [6].
2. Universal Background Model (UBM) approach [7].
The most important difference between the two techniques is that
in the latter approach the impostor likelihood is client independent.
We will evaluate the effectiveness of the above approaches for
improving the performance and robustness of four face authenti-
cation systems in a common framework - ie. classifier, database,
controlled image corruption via an illumination change and com-
pression artefacts. The four systems differ in the feature extrac-
tion method used: eigenfaces (PCA) [8], 2-D DCT [9], 2-D Gabor
wavelets [10] and DCT-mod2 [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we briefly review the feature extraction methods. In Section 3,
we describe the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) based classifier
which shall be used as the basis for experiments. In Section 4
we describe the two normalization approaches suited to the GMM
classifier. Section 5 is devoted to experiments. The results are
discussed and conclusions drawn in Section 6.
2. FEATURE EXTRACTION
In the eigenfaces approach [8], Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) is used to make low dimensionality representations of face
images. A given face image is represented by a matrix containing
grey level pixel values. The matrix is then converted to a face vec-
tor, ~f , by concatenating all the columns. A D-dimensional feature
vector, ~x, is then obtained by:
~x = U
T
(
~
f  
~
f

) (3)
where U contains D eigenvectors (with largest corresponding
eigenvalues) of the training data covariance matrix, and ~f

is the
mean of training face vectors. Typically, D = 40. In this work we
shall use the terms eigenfaces and PCA interchangeably.
In 2-D DCT feature extraction, a given face image is ana-
lyzed on a block by block basis. Each block is decomposed in
terms of 2-D DCT basis functions [9], resulting in a set of coeffi-
cients. For each block, the first M coefficients are used to form an
M -dimensional feature vector (typically, M = 15).
The DCT-mod2 approach is similar to 2-D DCT. The main
difference is that the feature vector for each block also contains
polynomial coefficients based on a subset of 2-D DCT coefficients
extracted from spatially neighbouring blocks [11]. The dimension-
ality of a DCT-mod2 feature vector is M + 3.
In 2-D Gabor wavelet feature extraction, a coarse rectangu-
lar grid is placed over a given image. At each node of the grid,
the image is analyzed by a set of biologically inspired 2-D Ga-
bor wavelets [10], differing in orientation and scale. Responses of
the wavelets are then used to form a G-dimensional feature vector
(typically, G = 18).
It must be emphasized that in the eigenfaces approach, one
feature vector represents the entire face, while in the other meth-
ods, one feature vector represents only a small portion of the face.
3. GMM BASED CLASSIFIER
Given a claim for person C’s identity and a set of feature vectors
X = f~x
i
g
N
V
i=1
supporting the claim (which may come from a se-
quence of images), the average log likelihood of the claimant being
the true claimant is calculated using:
L(Xj
C
) =
1
N
V
N
V
X
i=1
log p(~x
i
j
C
) (4)
where p(~xj) =
N
M
X
j=1
m
j
N (~x; ~
j
;
j
) (5)
and  = fm
j
; ~
j
;
j
g
N
M
j=1
(6)
Here 
C
is the model for personC. N
M
is the number of mixtures,
m
j
is the weight for mixture j (with constraint PNM
j=1
m
j
= 1),
and N (~x; ~;) is a multi-variate Gaussian function with mean ~
and diagonal covariance matrix .
Given the average log likelihood of the claimant being an im-
postor, L(Xj
C
), an opinion on the claim is found using:
(X) = L(Xj
C
)  L(Xj
C
) (7)
The verification decision is reached as follows: given a thresh-
old t, the claim is accepted when (X)  t and rejected when
(X) < t.
3.1. Model Construction
Given a set of training vectors (which may come from a sequence
of images), an N
M
-mixture GMM for each client can be con-
structed two ways:
1. Using a k-means clustering algorithm followed by 10
iterations of the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm
[12]. This approach is taken when using the BMS for nor-
malization (Section 4.1).
2. Adapting a previously constructed Universal Background
Model, 
UBM
, using a form of maximum a posteriori (MAP)
adaptation [7]. This is done when using the UBM approach
for normalization (Section 4.2).
4. NORMALIZATION APPROACHES
4.1. Background Model Set (BMS)
In this approach, the average log likelihood that the claim for per-
son C’s identity is from an impostor is calculated using a set of
background models, B = f
b
g
N
B
b=1
:
L(Xj
C
) = log
"
1
N
B
N
B
X
b=1
expL(Xj
b
)
#
(8)
The set of background models for each client is selected from the
pool of client models, as follows. Using training data, pair-wise
distances between each client model are found. For models 
D
and 
E
with corresponding training feature vector sets X
D
and
X
E
(which were used during the construction of the models), the
distance is defined as:
d(
D
; 
E
) = [L(X
D
j
D
)  L(X
D
j
E
)℄
+ [L(X
E
j
E
)  L(X
E
j
D
)℄ (9)
The above symmetric distance attempts to measure how similar (or
close) the models 
D
and 
E
are. The background model set con-
tains models which are the closest to, as well as the farthest from,
the client model. While it may intuitively seem that only the close
models are required (which represent the expected impostors), this
would leave the system vulnerable to impostors which are very dif-
ferent from the client. This is demonstrated by inspecting Eqn. (7),
where both terms would contain similar values, leading to an un-
reliable opinion on the claim.
For a given client model 
C
, N

closest models (N

 N
B
)
are placed in set . Similarly, N
	
farthest models (N
	
 N
B
)
are placed in set 	. Maximally spread models from the  set are
moved to set B
lose
using the following procedure:
1. Move the closest model from  to B
lose
.
2. Move 
i
from  to B
lose
, where 
i
is found using:

i
= arg max

j
2
2
4
1
N
B
lose
X

b
2B
lose
d(
b
; 
j
)
d(
C
; 
j
)
3
5 (10)
where N
B
lose
is the cardinality of B
lose
.
3. Repeat step (2) until N
B
lose
=
N
B
2
.
Next, maximally spread models from the 	 set are moved to set
B
far
using the following procedure:
1. Move the farthest model from 	 to B
far
.
2. Move 
i
from 	 to B
far
, where 
i
is found using:

i
= arg max

j
2	
2
4
1
N
B
far
X

b
2B
far
d(
b
; 
j
) d(
C
; 
j
)
3
5
(11)
where N
B
far
is the cardinality of B
far
.
3. Repeat step (2) until N
B
far
=
N
B
2
.
Finally, B = B
lose
[ B
far
. The above procedures for selecting
maximally spread models are required to reduce redundancy in the
B set [6].
4.2. Universal Background Model (UBM)
In this approach, pooled training data from all clients is utilized to
construct a Universal Background Model (
UBM
) using a k-means
clustering algorithm followed by 10 iterations of the EM algo-
rithm. The average log likelihood that the claim for person C’s
identity is from an impostor is found using:
L(Xj
C
) = L(Xj
UBM
) (12)
Moreover, instead of constructing the client models directly
from training data, they are generated by adapting 
UBM
, as fol-
lows. Given a set of training feature vectors for a specific client,
X = f~x
i
g
N
V
i=1
, and UBM parameters, f _m
k
;
_
~
k
;
_

k
g
N
M
k=1
, estimated
weights ( ^m
k
), means (^~
k
), and covariances (^
k
) are first found
using (for k = 1; :::; N
M
):
l
k;i
=
m
k
N (~x
i
;
_
~
k
;
_

k
)
P
N
M
n=1
_m
n
N (~x
i
;
_
~
n
;
_

n
)
for i = 1; :::; N
V
(13)
L
k
=
N
V
X
i=1
l
k;i
(14)
^m
k
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L
k
N
V
(15)
^
~
k
=
1
L
k
N
V
X
i=1
~x
i
l
k;i
(16)
^

k
=
1
L
k
"
N
V
X
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~x
i
~x
T
i
l
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#
 
^
~
k
^
~
T
k
(17)
The final parameters, fm
k
; ~
k
;
k
g
N
M
k=1
, are found by adapting
the UBM parameters as follows:
m
k
= [ ^m
k
+ (1  ) _m
k
℄  (18)
~
k
= 
^
~
k
+ (1  )
_
~
k
(19)

k
=
h


^

k
+
^
~
k
^
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T
k

+ (1  )

_

k
+
_
~
k
_
~
T
k
)
i
 ~
k
~
T
k
(20)
where  is a scale factor to make sure all mixture weights sum
to 1.  = Lk
L
k
+r
is a data-dependent adaptation coefficient where
r is a fixed relevance factor (typically r = 16, Ref.[7]). It must
be noted that UBM mixture components will only be adapted if
there is sufficient correspondence with client training data. Thus
to prevent the final client models not being specific enough, the
UBM must adequately represent the general client population.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
5.1. VidTIMIT Audio-Visual Database
The VidTIMIT database [11], created by the authors, is comprised
of video and corresponding audio recordings of 43 people (19
female and 24 male), reciting short sentences. It was recorded
in 3 sessions, with a mean delay of 7 days between Session 1
and 2, and 6 days between Session 2 and 3. The mean dura-
tion of each sentence is 4.25 seconds, or approximately 106 video
frames. For more information on the database, please see [11] or
http://spl.me.gu.edu.au/vidtimit/
5.2. Experiment Setup
Before feature extraction can occur, the face must first be
located [13]. Furthermore, to account for varying distances to the
camera, a geometrical normalization must be performed. We treat
the problem of face location and size normalization as separate
from feature extraction.
To find the face, we use template matching with several pro-
totype faces of varying dimensions. Using the distance between
the eyes as a size measure, an affine transformation is used [9]
Fig. 1. Example face windows; left: clean; middle: corrupted
with illumination change; right: corrupted with compression artefacts
(PSNR=31.7 dB)
to adjust the size of the image, resulting in the distance between
the eyes to be the same for each person. Finally a 56  64 pixel
face window, w(y; x), containing the eyes and the nose (the most
invariant face area to changes in the expression and hair style) is
extracted from the image.
For PCA, the dimensionality of the face window is reduced
to 40 (choice based on the work by Samaria [14] and Belhumeur
[15]). For 2-D DCT and DCT-mod2 methods, each block is 8 8
pixels. Moreover, each block overlaps with horizontally and ver-
tically adjacent blocks by 50%. The dimensionality of 2-D DCT
and DCT-mod2 feature vectors is 15 and 18, respectively. For Ga-
bor features, we follow Duc [2] where the dimensionality of the
Gabor feature vectors is 18. The location of the wavelet centers
was chosen to be as close as possible to the centers of the blocks
used in DCT-mod2 feature extraction.
To reduce the computational burden during modeling and test-
ing, every second video frame was used. For each feature ex-
traction method, 8 mixture client models (GMMs) were generated
from features extracted from face windows in Session 1.
For experiments involving an illumination change, the method
described in [11] (using Æ = 80) was utilized to introduce an ar-
tificial illumination change to face windows extracted from Ses-
sions 2 and 3.
For experiments involving compression artefacts, face win-
dows extracted from Sessions 2 and 3 were processed by a JPEG
codec [16], resulting in an average PSNR of 31.13 dB. Example
face windows are shown in Fig. 1.
To find the performance, Sessions 2 and 3 were used for ob-
taining example opinions of known impostor and true claims. Four
utterances, each from 8 fixed persons (4 male and 4 female), were
used for simulating impostor accesses against the remaining 35
persons. For each of the remaining 35 persons, their four utter-
ances were used separately as true claims. 10 background models
were selected from the 35 client models (N

= N
	
= 10). The
impostor utterances were not used during the generation of 
UBM
.
When deriving client models from 
UBM
, only the weights and
means were adapted - preliminary experiments showed that adapt-
ing the covariance matrices resulted in poorer performance.
For each experimental configuration, there were 1120 impos-
tor and 140 true claims. The (person independent) decision thresh-
old was then set so the a posteriori performance is as close as pos-
sible to Equal Error Rate (EER) (ie. where the False Acceptance
Rate is equal to the False Rejection Rate). In all experiments, clean
and corrupted face windows were used.
In the first experiment, EER performance of all face authenti-
cation systems was found without normalization (L(Xj
C
) = 0).
Results are shown in Fig. 2.
In the second experiment, the impostor likelihood was calcu-
lated using client specific BMS. All models were constructed di-
rectly from the training data. Results are shown in Fig. 3.
In the final experiment, the impostor likelihood was calculated
using the UBM approach and the client models were constructed
by adapting 
UBM
. Results are shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 2. EER performance without normalization
Fig. 3. EER performance using BMS normalization
Fig. 4. EER performance using UBM normalization
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
When using PCA derived features, the BMS based normalization
has very little effect on the performance. This is in contrast to the
UBM based normalization, where it appears that there are signif-
icant performance gains when using clean and corrupted images
(eg. when using illumination corrupted images, the EER is re-
duced from 39.29% to 27.73%).
Recall that data from all clients is used to find 
UBM
. In the
UBM approach, client models are created by adapting 
UBM
(via
MAP) using client specific data. This is in contrast to directly com-
puting the client models using the EM algorithm, where only client
specific data is used. Effectively there is approximately 30 times
more data used during MAP based training than in direct EM based
training. Thus the apparent performance improvement when using
the UBM based normalization can be attributed to MAP training
of the client models rather than the process of likelihood normal-
ization. Further experiments (not reported here) support this asser-
tion.
The rest of the discussion concerns 2-D DCT, 2-D Gabor and
DCT-mod2 features. When using these features with the GMM
classifier, the spatial relation between major face features (eg. eyes
and nose) is lost. While this inherently allows a degree of robust-
ness to image translation, it results in poor performance when com-
pared to the PCA/GMM combination. Thus in these cases, use of
likelihood normalization is important in order to obtain good per-
formance. The gains are quite staggering - eg. for DCT-mod2
features, the EER drops from 39.2% to 2.05% when using clean
images and the BMS normalization approach. It can be observed
that the BMS approach generally provides the most performance
gain. The UBM approach is only better for two cases: 2-D DCT
and 2-D Gabor features with face windows corrupted with the il-
lumination change.
These experiments also allow us to compare the relative ro-
bustness of all the features. We can observe that PCA derived
features are the most affected by the illumination change, while
being the least affected by compression artefacts. When employ-
ing likelihood normalization, DCT-mod2 features are generally
the least affected by the illumination change, closely followed by
2-D Gabor wavelets. However, 2-D Gabor wavelets, compared to
DCT-mod2 features, are less affected by compression artefacts.
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